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In this paper we analyze the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size  and 
development of the shadow economies. The framework developed predicts a negative 
relationship between the degree of direct democracy and the size of the shadow economy. 
Countries where direct democratic institutions support democratic life are  expected to be 
characterized by a lower informal sector, ceteris paribus. The empirical / econometric 
investigation of a sample of 56 democracies confirms our core hypothesis and demonstrates 
that the effect of direct democratic institutions on the shadow  economy is negative and 
quantitatively important; the results are robust and also depend on the interaction of direct 
democracy with other political institutions, such as district magnitude. 
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1.   Introduction 
This article is a first attempt to analyze the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size 
and development of the shadow economy. The basic motivation of our study is that understanding the 
mapping  from  institutional  arrangements  into  policy  outcomes  is  an  essential  precondition  for 
evaluating both economic performances and the attitude of citizens towards the state and the law.  
For most quite large countries informal sector concerns all politicians and managers around the 
world and threats to seriously impede government intervention, especially during a period of crisis. 
At the same time, the quality of government intervention might distort economic activity and alter 
the  social  contract  between  institutions  and  citizens.  Like  two  sides  of  the  same  medal,  the 
development of shadow economy and low quality of governance are likely to be caught in a vicious 
circle, which is able to worsen state capacity. 
Over the past decade the analysis of the shadow economy has attracted increasing interest. 
Various studies consider institutional characteristics as a key factor in the development of informal 
sector (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Friedman et al. 2000; Torgler and Schneider 2007; Schneider, 
2010). In these studies the authors argue that the inefficient and discretionary application of tax system 
and regulations by government might play a crucial role in the decision of operating unofficially, even 
more important than the burden of taxes and regulations. In particular, corruption of bureaucracy and 
government officials seems to be associated with larger unofficial activities, while a good rule of law, 
by securing property rights and contracts enforceability, increases the benefits of being formal (e.g. 
Johnson et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1998a,b; Dreher and Schneider, 2010).  
Our analysis is complementary and new to this field of research. In trying to assess which 
variables  play  a  role  in  the  state-society  interactions  underlying  informality,  we  specially  paid 
attention to governance and institutional quality measures, like direct democracy and accountability 
indexes, rather than to traditional variables, as this approach has been neglected in previous related 
studies.  In  particular  and  for  the  first  time,  the  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  theoretically  and 
empirically, on a cross-country basis, the effects of direct democratic institutions on the size of the 
shadow economy. In our opinion, the development of the informal sector can also be considered as a 
consequence  of  the  failure  of  public  institutions  to  support  an  efficient  market  economy,  through 
appropriate public good provision. This can occur when the government is either wasteful or corrupt, 
with great discretionary power over the allocation of resources. Citizens who feel overburdened by the 
state, do not perceive their interests and preferences properly represented in political institutions and 
lose their trust in the authority. They will choose the “exit option” and decide to work in the informal 
sector as a reaction to inefficient governments (Schneider and Enste, 2002; Hirschman, 1970). Direct 3 
 
democratic institutions provide citizens with the “voice option” over government performance. They 
have the potential to constrain, both directly and indirectly, the ability of politicians to extract rents from 
public  spending,  and  therefore  represent  a  form  of  non  insulation  of  politicians.  Moreover,  direct 
democracy may act as a valid correction mechanism for the low accountability of governments. A 
government which self-imposes checks and allow citizens to be actively involved in the policymaking 
process, indicates that it trusts its constituency and takes into account its preferences. As a consequence, 
citizens  who  perceive  government as  benevolent and  recognize  their  interests  properly  represented, 
identify  with  the  state  and  are  more  willing  to  comply.  They  become  more  conscious  of  the 
opportunities available to eventually complain. Direct democracy might then help altering the incentives 
of behaving illegally.  
The layout of our paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review. Section 3 
deals with theoretical considerations about the costs and benefits of direct democratic institutions 
and presents a model that provides explanation of the transmission channels trough which direct 
democracy influences the size of informal sector. In Section 4 we present the empirical evidence, 
first the data and estimation approach is described, and concrete hypotheses are formulated and 
finally  the  empirical  results  are  shown.  After  that  in  section  6  a  summary  is  given  and  three 
connections are drawn. 
 
 
2.  A Short Literature Review 
 
The existing literature on the economic effects of direct democratic institutions follows two main 
strands: a number of empirical studies, mainly based either on Switzerland or the United States, 
evaluated the impact of direct democracy on fiscal policy and government efficiency (Pommerehne, 
1978;  Pommerehne  and  Schneider,  1978;  Frey,  1994;  Matsusaka,  1995,  2004;  Feld  and 
Kirchgässner, 2001a,b; Feld and Matsusaka, 2003; Blomberg et al., 2004; Blume et al., 2009), yet 
other studies have focused on the effects that direct voter participation in political decision may 
have on citizens attitudes towards institutions, in terms of tax morale and civic trust in government 
(Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1996; Frey, 1997; Alm et al. 1999; Schneider and Enste, 
2002; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Torgler, 2005; Torgler and Schaltegger, 2005).  
The common theme of this literature is that democratic participation possibilities by taxpayers 
lead public spending to be more efficient and in line with the preferences of citizens. In particular, 
Pommerehne (1978) and Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) demonstrate that in Swiss cities where 
citizens’  participation  in  public  decision-making  is  only  indirect,  the  government  and  public 
bureaucracy prove to be unresponsive to voters’ preferences over public expenditures, though these 4 
 
are  taken  more  and  more  into  consideration  as  elections  approach.  Specifically  Frey  (1994) 
discusses the properties of direct democratic institutions and argues that popular referendums are 
effective mechanisms by which the voters can control the policy choices of state governments and 
express collective preferences. He highlights that in 39 percent of the referendums that took place in 
Switzerland during the period from 1848 until 1990, the majority’s will was different from the 
established  will  of  the  Parliament.  Feld  and  Kirchgässner  (2001a,b),  taking  into  account  Swiss 
municipalities,  show  that  mandatory  budget  referendums  are  associated  with  both  lower  total 
expenditure per capita and reduced per capita debt. Feld and Matsusaka (2003) estimate regressions 
for  Swiss  cantons  using  panel  data  from  1990  to  1998  and  find  evidence  that  mandatory 
referendums  reduce  government  spending  by  19  percent.  With  regard  to  the  United  States, 
Matsusaka  (1995;  2004)  analyzes  the  impact  of  initiatives  on  fiscal  policy  and  finds  that  state 
initiatives improve resources allocation. In particular, he concentrates on the effects of initiatives 
over a 30 year period and observes that initiatives are employed to constrain tax burdens as well as 
to lower the overall state and local government spending. Blomberg et al. (2004) obtain that over 
the years 1969–1986, among 48 US states, initiative states were between 20 to 30 percent more 
effective in providing public capital than non-initiative states, reaching a better economic outcome 
in terms of higher GDP growth. Blume et al. (2009) try to evaluate the economic effects of direct 
democracy  on  a  cross-country  basis.  Considering  a  sample  of  88  countries,  they  find  that  the 
presence  of  direct  democracy  institutions  is  correlated  with  lower  government  expenditure, 
especially in countries with weak democracies.  
Although extensive literature on different aspects regarding the shadow economy exists, only 
very few studies address the influence of direct democratic institutions. Various studies suggest that 
higher  participation  rights  raise  direct  political  control  and  boost  tax  morale.  Pommerehne  and 
Weck-Hannemann (1996) find noncompliance to be negatively correlated with direct control of 
citizens/taxpayers  over  government  budgets  for  Swiss  cantons.  Frey  (1997)  argues  that  direct 
citizens’  participation,  via  popular  referendums  and  initiatives,  can  enhance  civic  virtue  and 
increase the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. Schneider and Enste (2002) state that proper elements 
of  direct  democracy,  together  with  fiscal  federalism,  might  strengthen  public  trust  in  political 
institutions and foster tax morality. Alm et al. (1999), Feld and Tyran  (2002) and Torgler and 
Schaltegger (2005) provide experimental evidence on the positive link between voting on tax issues 
and tax compliance. Torgler (2005) using survey data for Switzerland finds that direct democratic 
rights have a significant positive effect on tax morale. 
Our paper is an attempt to bring together these two fields of research and for the first time 
introduces  an  innovation  by  providing  a  possible  theoretical  explanation  of  the  transmission 5 
 
channels trough which direct democratic institutions influence the size of informal sector, and by 
testing the theoretical implications highlighted on a cross-country basis.  
 
 
3.   Theoretical background 
 
Direct democracy identifies a variety of political processes that assign to ordinary citizens the right 
to directly decide on certain political issues through popular votes. In other words, under direct 
democracy people can vote directly on laws rather than candidates for office, independently on the 
wishes of government or parliament.
4  
All forms of direct democracy deal with the decision of citizens on substantive laws listed on 
the ballot, called ballot measures or propositions. Ballot measures can concern either the proposal 
of a new law or the abolishing of an old law. Moreover, there are differences on how propositions 
come to the ballot. In particular, we can distinguish between initiatives, that allow the citizens to 
propose  a  new  law  pertaining  to  different  levels  of  legislation  (constitutional  versus  ordinary 
legislation) and related to a variety of scopes; and referendum, that is a vote on a law already 
approved by the legislature. Both these forms of direct democracy allow the citizens to control the 
agenda and typically require a predetermined number of signatures from eligible voters to qualify 
for  the  ballot.  On  the  contrary,  advisory  measures,  are  placed  on  the  ballot  directly  by  the 
legislature when the constitution requires popular approval before a law becomes effective or when 
public opinion needs to be involved. These types of direct democracy  significantly vary in the 
details of their implementation process. For example, final approval may require a majority vote of 
the electorate or quorum requirements may be established. Moreover, the number of signatures 
necessary to qualify initiatives or referendum varies among countries. Laws approved under direct 
democracy  may  be  easy  or  difficult  to  amend,  depending  on  whether  the  intervention  of  the 
legislature is required or not (Matsusaka, 2005). 
Direct democratic institutions are old and firmly  established forms of  government in some 
countries, but they have also spread increasingly over the past few decades becoming a global 
phenomenon.
5 This expansion has attracted the interest of several scholars and there is much debate 
                                                 
4 This means that direct elections of president and mayors are not part of direct democratic institutions.  
5 According to the Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (2005), 517 popular votes on the national level all over 
the world have been documented between 1991 and 2004, while the Search Engine for direct democracy mentions 432 
worldwide referendums and initiatives over the period 1984-1994, and 492 between 1995 and 2004 (Fiorino and 
Ricciuti, 2007). 6 
 
about their role. According to Matsusaka (2005), three main theoretical arguments about the costs 
and  benefits  of  direct  democracy  deserve  particular  attention,  that  is  principal-agent  problems 
between the citizens and the government, asymmetric information and issue bundling. It has been 
emphasized that the agency problems arising between voters and their elected representatives may 
lead the governments not to act in the interest of their constituencies. In this case, direct democratic 
institutions might contribute positively to the efficiency of political decision-making process in two 
ways. First, direct democracy may exert a direct effect on policy, as referendums and initiatives can 
override the decisions of policymakers by  removing their discretion. Second, direct democratic 
institutions may also work indirectly, as the simple threat of a ballot proposition may be sufficient 
to induce elected officials to choose policies more close to the preferences of the median voter. In 
our framework, both effects are at work and discussed. 
However, a recurrent criticism to direct democracy is that representative are more likely than 
the average citizen to have the experience, judgment and information to make the proper policy 
decision  (Maskin  and  Tirole,  2004).  There  are  complex  policy  issues  where  only  elected 
representative have at their disposal the information required to implement a welfare enhancing 
decision. In these cases, the intervention of voters could constrain the policy choices of government 
or make governance more inefficient and complex. However, it could be argued that under direct 
democracy both citizens and their representatives should be better informed, as the use of direct 
democratic institutions facilitates discussions on policy issues. The existence of the right to directly 
intervene in policymaking process provides voters with the incentive to stay more informed than in 
representative democracies, which means that this line of argument is not so sharp-cutting. Finally, 
it is agreed that initiatives and referendums enable citizens to unbundle specific issues, which forces 
a closer correspondence between policy outcomes and citizens preferences and promote anti-special 
interest legislation counteracting the effects of log-rolling in legislatures (Matsusaka, 1995; Besley 
and Coates, 2003). 
Less developed analyses concentrate on the implications of direct democratic institutions for 
tax evasion and government corruption. The repercussions of direct democracy on citizens attitudes 
towards  government  institutions  depends  on  the  procedures  just  discussed.  The  potential  to 
participate in collective decision-making improves the legitimacy of the political system before 
citizens and lowers their inclination to cheat on taxes (Feld and Savioz, 1997; Frey, 1997). At the 
same time, as long as political processes become more transparent and policymakers are considered 
more accountable, corruption should be less pervasive (Blume et al., 2009). 
 
Our theoretical analysis builds on the theory of direct democratic institutions as a discipline 7 
 
device. In particular, in the next section we lay out a model linking the impact of direct democracy 
on the shadow economy through the fiscal policy choices made by elected politicians. The economy 
consists of individuals who can allocate their labor between two sectors, the formal and the informal 
one. Production in the formal sector also requires some productive public services and is perfectly 
observable by the tax authorities. Production in the informal sector relies only on labor  and is 
completely unobservable by the authorities, which implies that it cannot be taxed. The revenues of 
the public sector can be used to provide both productive public services and rents to politicians. The 
politician has to decide the level of taxation, provision of public services and rents under the risk 
that citizens will promote a referendum to reject the reformed fiscal policy.  
The model predicts that higher levels of direct democracy favor the implementation of fiscal 
policies closer to the preferences of citizens; these policies are more efficient and able to reduce 
individuals incentives to operate in the informal sector. The theoretical analysis also leads to the 
conclusion that direct democracy is likely to  exert nonlinear effects on the size of the shadow 
economy, i.e., more direct democracy reduces the shadow economy at low or intermediate levels, 
while the effect of such increase is likely to be limited when direct democratic institutions are 
already quite good.  
 
 
  3.1 The Model 
 
This paper considers an economy of a continuum of individuals of measure 1. There is a unique 
final good that can be produced by two sectors, the formal and the informal one. Each agent i is a 
consumer-producer who supplies inelastically 1 unit of labor, which he can allocate between the 
formal sector ( f i l , ) and the informal one ( s i l , ) so that 
(1)  1 , , = + s i f i l l . 
The production function in the formal sector is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale in 
labor and in the quantity of per capita public services g,
6 and it is defined as 
(2) 
a a - =
1
, , g l y f i f i , 
where  1 0 < <a . Production in the informal sector does not require the input provided by the public 
sector, so the shadow economy’s production function is given by 
                                                 
6  It  is  clear  from  the  production  function  that  the  productive  input  provided  by  the  public  sector  is  essential  for 
production and that there is congestion in the sense that what matters for production is the per-capita level of public 




s i s i al y , , = , 
where  1 0 < < b  and a>0. 
Each agent chooses the optimal allocation of labor between the two sectors and consumes all 
income  produced  net  of  taxes.  Income  in  the  formal  sector  is  perfectly  observable  by  the  tax 
authorities and can be taxed at a constant rate  [ ] 1 , 0 Î t . In contrast, production in the informal sector 
is  completely  unobservable,  which  implies  that  it  cannot  be  taxed  by  the  public  authorities. 
Therefore, from (1), (2) and (3) follows that the disposable income of agent i is 
(4) 
b a a
i i d i al g l t y + - - =
- 1
, ) 1 )( 1 ( , 
where  i l  denotes the amount worked by agent i in the unofficial economy. 
The revenues of the public sector are equal to 
(5) 
a a a a - -
= =












where we have used the fact that  l li =  for all i since all agents are identical and face the same fiscal 
policy. The revenues can be used to provide productive public services and/or to provide rents to 
politicians. Let G denote the total provision of public services and  [ ] 1 , 0 Î g  the fraction of revenues 
E spent for public services,
7 so that  g - 1  denotes the fraction of revenues used for politician’s rents. 
The government budget constraint is thus  E G g = . If we take into account the unitary mass of the 
population  and  the  expression  for  E  in  (5),  the  government  budget  constraint  becomes 
a a g
- - =
1 ) 1 ( g l t g  and can be rewritten as 
(6)  ). 1 (
/ 1 / 1 l t g - =
a a g  
We shall refer to t and g  as the fiscal policy variables to be chosen by the politician, given that  g  
is uniquely determined by the government budget constraint (6). 
The total utility of the politician is 
(7)  B p E u R + - = ) 1 ( g , 
where the first component is the current monetary rent, B>0 are the (exogenous) future benefits 
from being in office and R p is the probability of being reelected. 
We consider a one period economy with a politician in office. Nature chooses randomly the 
status quo fiscal policy  ) , ( 0 0 g t  at the beginning of the period and the politician decides whether 
                                                 
7 Politician’s rents are modeled here as a cash transfer, but one could also assume the existence of a nonproductive 
public good that gives utility to politician only. 
 9 
 
changing it or not; we denote with  ) , ( c c t g  the reformed policy.
8 After the policy has been chosen, 
citizens  may  mobilize  and  promote  a  referendum  against  the  reform.  If  this  takes  place,  then 
citizens vote and decide whether the reform can be implemented or not. If the reform is rejected, 
then the status quo policy is implemented. Finally, elections take place on the reappointment of the 
politician. 
We assume that promoting a referendum is costly for the citizens, and that this cost  i h  is equal 
for  all  individuals,  i.e.,  ) (d h h = i   for  all  i,  where  ] , [ d d d Î   is  an  index  of  the  level  of  direct 
democracy. We also assume that  0 ) ( < ¢ º ¶ ¶ d h d h  which captures the idea that at higher levels of 
direct democracy correspond a lower cost of mobilization to organize a referendum. Individuals are 
assumed to enjoy a positive nonmonetary benefit  i e  from promoting a referendum. This payoff 
differs across agents and has the cumulative distribution function  ) (e F , with  ) ( ) ( e e f F º ¢ . As 
each individual has zero mass, he will not consider the monetary payoff in deciding whether to 
mobilize or not for the referendum, so that this will be promoted only by the agents with payoff 
0 ³ -h ei . This implies that a referendum will take place only with some probability even when all 
citizens have an economic gain from blocking the reform and implementing the status quo policy. 
In order to capture the fact that the incentive of the citizens to promote a referendum may depend on 
the size of the economic gain from blocking the reform, we assume that only a fraction q of the 












t y t y
t q
d




The expression of q in (8) means that the lower is the net disposable income of the reformed policy 
) , ( c c t g  relative to the status quo  ) , ( 0 0 g t , and the higher the share of citizens putting effort to 
promote a referendum. From the above assumptions follows that the probability that a referendum 
will take place when this optimal for the citizens is 
(9)  [ ] )) ( ( 1 ) , ( ) , , ( d h g g d F t q t P c c c c - = , 
which is decreasing in the citizens’ net income  ) , ( c c d t y g  from the reformed policy and increasing 
in the level of direct democracy, since  0 ) ( < ¢ d h . 
We now move to characterize the equilibrium of the model and determine the effect of direct 
democracy on the equilibrium policy and the size of the shadow economy.  
                                                 




  3.2 The Equilibrium 
 
We first determine the individual optimal allocation of labor among sectors for any given policy set 
by the politician. The result is contained in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1. If the government taxes the income produced in the formal sector at rate  ) 1 , 0 ( Î t  and 
uses the fraction  ) 1 , 0 ( Î g  of total revenues for the provision of public services, then the amount of 






/ ) 1 ( / ) 1 (
b











= - - t t
a
t l  






























with  ) , ( g t l l º  defined by (10). This means that  0 / < ¶ ¶ g l  and that  t l ¶ ¶ / ⋛0 for t⋛ a - 1 , and that 
1 = l  for  0 = t ,  1 = t  or  0 = g . Therefore, the fiscal policy maximizing the citizens’ net disposable 
income is  a - =1
* t  and  1
* = g . 




i i d i
l
al g l t y
i
+ - - =
- 1
, ) 1 )( 1 (    max . 
From the first order condition of problem (13) with respect to  i l , using the government budget 
constraint (6) and the fact that all individuals are identical (i.e.,  l li =  for all i), we obtain the 
optimal amount of labor employed in the informal sector by each agent is the one reported in (10). 
The expressions (11) and (12) are obtained from the differentiation of (10) and rearranging terms. ■ 
Expression (10) makes it clear that the amount worked in the informal sector is monotonically 11 
 
decreasing in g  and, therefore, takes the minimum value at  1 = g . Other things equal, the higher is 
the fraction of revenues  g  used for the provision of productive public services, the higher is the 
marginal productivity in the formal sector (relative to the informal one), and the lower will be the 
labor supply in the shadow economy.  0 = g  means that public services are not provided and that 
there cannot be production in the formal sector, so that  1 = l , and the same is true when  0 = t . All 
labor is employed in the shadow economy if  1 = t  because all production in the formal sector accrue 
to  the  government  revenues.  The  relationship  between  l  and  t,  for  a  given  g ,  is  instead 
nonmonotonic:  l is decreasing in  t when  a - <1 t , it is at its minimum at  a - =1 t , and then it 
becomes increasing in  t for  a - >1 t . The intuition for this result has to do with the fact that the 
allocation of labor depends on its relative net marginal productivity across the two sectors, and that 
an increase in taxation generates two opposite effects affecting the net marginal productivity of 
labor  in  the  formal  sector  (while  leaving  unaffected  the  marginal  productivity  in  the  shadow 
economy). On the one hand, higher taxation has a direct effect on the reduction of the net marginal 
productivity of labor in the formal sector where taxes cannot be avoided. On the other hand, more 
taxation  means  more  provision  of  productive  public  services  and,  therefore,  a  higher  marginal 
productivity of labor in the formal sector. When taxation is relatively low ( a - <1 t ), the increase in 
the provision of public services due to an increase of the tax rate generates an increase in the 
marginal  productivity  of  labor  in  the  formal  sector  that  more  than  compensate  the  increase  of 
taxation. This means that the net marginal productivity of labor in the formal sector increases, and 
the supply of labor in the informal sector goes down. The opposite happens for relatively high 
levels  of  taxation  (i.e.,  for  a - >1 t ).  These  considerations  also  suggest  the  existence  of  a 
monotonic relationship between the net disposable income and the level of shadow economy, which 
is stated in the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. There exists a monotonic negative relationship between the net disposable income of 
the agent and the labor employed in the shadow economy, i.e.,  0 < ¶ ¶ l y d . 
Proof.  From  optimal  level  of  labor  employed  in  the  informal  sector  (10)  follows  that 
) 1 ( / ) 1 ( ) / ( ) 1 ( ) (
b a a a b g
- - - = - l a t t . Substituting this expression in (13) and taking into account of the 
government  budget  constraint  (6)  implies  that  the  maximized  net  disposable  income  of  each 
individual is 
b b a b al l l a yd + - =
- - ) 1 ( ) / (
) 1 ( * . Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to 
l leads to  0
1 1

















b . ■ 
This  result  is  important  because  it  establishes  that  any  policy  increasing  the  maximized 
disposable  income  of  the  individuals  involves  an  unambiguous  negative  effect  on  the  labor 12 
 
employed in the shadow economy. Moreover, the following result will also be useful. 
Corollary 2. The size of the shadow economy is monotonically positively related to the amount of 
labor employed in the informal sector by the representative agent. 
Proof. Taking into account the unitary measure of the population, the size of the shadow economy 
is given by  d y al /
b . Since  d y  is decreasing in l (see Corollary 1), it is straightforward that this ratio 
will be increasing in l. ■ 
We now determine the fiscal policy chosen by a politician maximizing his own utility without 
the constraint that a referendum will take place. This problem involves the maximization of the 
utility in (7), subject the government budget constraint (6) and the individuals’ reaction function 
(10). Substituting (6) into (7), this problem can be rewritten as 
(14)  B p l t u R t
+ - - =
- ) 1 ( ) 1 (    max




g g . 
The solution to problem (14) is summarized in the following lemma. 
Lemma 2. The unconstrained optimal fiscal policy for the politician is setting taxation and the 





























where  ) , (
s s s t l l g º  is given by (10),  a - = >
* 1 t t
s , and  1
* = < g g
s . This implies that the amount 
of per capita public services provided is less than optimal, 
* g g
s < , and that the amount of labor 
allocated by each agent to informal activities is higher than the level chosen under the efficient 
fiscal policy,  ) , ( ) , (
* * * g g t l l t l l
s s s º > º . 
Proof. See Appendix A. ■ 
We now move to characterize the equilibrium of the model by determining the fiscal policy 
chosen  by  the  politician  that  maximizes  his  utility  taking  into  account  the  possibility  of  a 
referendum.  In particular, the politician has two possible strategies. One is to select the policy 
contained in Lemma 2 and bear the risk of a referendum and the implementation of the status quo 
policy. We call this the nonprevention strategy. The other possibility for the politician is choosing a 
policy that gives no incentive to the citizens to promote a referendum and that improves the utility 
of the politician. We define this as the prevention strategy. 
Let us start from the analysis of the prevention strategy. In this case, the politician chooses the 
fiscal policy solving the maximization problem (15) subject to the constraint that the net disposable 
income of the agents under the reformed fiscal policy is not lower than the one they would obtain 13 
 
under the status quo policy, i.e., 
(16)  ) , ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) , (
/ ) 1 (
0 0
/ ) 1 (
0 0 0 0 g g g g
b a a b a a t y al l t t al l t t t y d d º + - - £ + - - º
- - , 
where  ) , ( 0 0 0 g t l l º  defined in (10). Note that in (16), we have substituted the government budget 
constraint (6) and used the fact that all individuals are identical as in the proof of Lemma 1. The 
following lemma characterizes the solution to this problem. 
Lemma 3. The optimal fiscal policy for the politician under prevention,  ) , ( P P t g , solving problem 
(15)  subject  to  (16),  has  the  following  properties.  If  the  constraint  (16)  is  not  binding, 
) , ( ) , ( 0 0
s s
d d t y t y g g £ ,  then  the  politician  chooses  the  fiscal  policy  reported  in  Lemma  2,  i.e., 
s
P t t =   and 
s
P g g = .  If  instead  the  constraint  (16)  is  binding,  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0
s s
d d t y t y g g > ,  then  the 
reformed  policy  ) , ( P P t g   is  such  that  ] , 1 [
s
P t t a - Î   and  ] 1 , [
s
P g g Î ,  where  at  least  one  of  the 
following two inequalities hold: 
s
P t t < , 
s
P g g > . Moreover, when constraint (16) is binding, this 
always holds with the equality sign in equilibrium, i.e.,  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 P P d d t y t y g g = . The fiscal policy 
) , ( P P t g  is independent on the level of direct democracy d . 
Proof. The first part of the lemma is immediate; if the constraint is not binding, the politician 
chooses the unconstrained optimum  ) , (
s s t g  described in Lemma 2. If the constraint is binding at 
) , (
s s t g , then the politician needs to increase the utility  of the citizens. 
s t t >  is never optimal 
because the utilities of the politician and individuals are both decreasing in t, and  a - º < 1
* t t  is 
also not optimal because both utilities are increasing in t; therefore,  ] , 1 [
s
P t t a - Î  as u and  d y  are 
respectively (strictly) increasing and decreasing in t in this range.  ] 1 , [
s
P g g Î  comes from the fact 
that u and  d y  are both (strictly) increasing in g  for all 
s g g < . 
s
P t t <  and/or 
s
P g g >  follows from 
(16) binding. The last part of the lemma is immediate since d  does not appear in any part of the 
problem. ■ 
Lemma 3 states that the policy reform when the politician wants to avoid a referendum takes 
intermediate values between the optimal policy of the politician,  ) , (
s s t g , and the optimal policy of 
the agents,  ) 1 , (
* t . It is clear that the higher the utility of the agents from the status quo policy 
) , ( 0 0 g t , and the closer the reformed policy will be to the optimal one. It is also worth emphasizing 
that the level of direct democracy does not have any effect on the reformed policy in this case since 
the policy chosen has to be such that it is never optimal for the citizens to promote a referendum. 
The politician has also the option of choosing a fiscal policy and face the risk of a referendum 
(nonprevention strategy). In this case, the politician maximizes the following expected utility 14 
 
(17)  ) , ( )] , , ( 1 [ ) , ( ) , , ( ) , , ( E    max 0 0 , g g d g g d g d
g t u t P t u t P t u
t - + = , 
subject the government budget constraint (6) and the individuals’ reaction function (10), and where 
) , , ( g d t P  is defined by (9). The following lemma provides the solution to this problem. 
Lemma  4.  The  optimal  fiscal  policy  for  the  politician  under  nonprevention,  ) , ( N N t g ,  solving 
problem  (17),  has  the  following  properties.  As  in  Lemma  3,  if  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0
s s
d d t y t y g g £ ,  then  the 
politician  selects  the  fiscal  policy  ) , (
s s t g   reported  in  Lemma  2;  and,  similarly,  if 
) , ( ) , ( 0 0
s s
d d t y t y g g > , the reformed policy  ) , ( N N t g  is such that  ] , 1 [
s
N t t a - Î  and  ] 1 , [
s
N g g Î , with 
s
N t t <  and/or 
s
N g g > . The reformed policy does depend on the degree of direct democracy, i.e., 
)) ( ), ( ( d g d N N t , and more direct democracy pushes the policy to a level closer to the optimal one. 
Proof. The first part of the lemma is straightforward. The optimal solution can be computed using 
the same steps reported in the proof of Lemma 2 taking into account that  0 ) , , ( > ¶ ¶ t t P g d  and 
0 ) , , ( < ¶ ¶ g g d t P  in the relevant range of the parameter space. Moreover, from  0 ) , , ( > ¶ ¶ d g d t P  
and  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 N N t u t u g g <  follows that the maximized expected utility  of the politician in (17) is 
decreasing in the level of direct democracy d . ■ 
When the politician follows the strategy of nonprevention, he takes the risk that a referendum is 
promoted and that the status quo policy is implemented. In this case, the level of direct democracy 
has two beneficial effects on fiscal policy. A higher level of  d  increases the probability that a 
referendum  takes  place,  and  therefore  that  the  more  efficient  status  quo  policy  is  implemented 
rather than the reformed policy. A higher level of direct democracy also leads the politician to 
choose a less distortionary policies in order to reduce the incentives of the citizens to promote a 
referendum. 
The following proposition characterizes the optimal behavior of the politician. 
Proposition  1.  There  exists  a  level  of  direct  democracy,  d d d £ <
* ,  such  that  the  politician 
chooses the strategy of nonprevention described in Lemma 4 for all 
* d d £ , and the strategy of 
prevention reported in Lemma 3 for all 
* d d > . 
Proof. The result comes from the following two facts. The strategy of nonprevention gives the 
politician  the  maximal  unconstrained  utility  for  the  lowest  level  of  direct  democracy  (as  this 
corresponds to the case where referendums are not allowed), as the fiscal policy implemented is 
) , ( ) , (
s s
N N t t g g = . The expected utility under nonprevention is decreasing in  d , while the utility 
from prevention is independent on d  and it is always strictly lower than the unconstrained utility 
) , (
s s t u g . However, it cannot be excluded that the nonprevention strategy always dominates the 15 
 
prevention one, i.e.,  ) , ( )) ( ), ( ( P P N N t u t u g d g d ³  for all  ] , [ d d d Î , and therefore that  d d =
* . ■ 
We can now establish the effect of direct democracy on the level of shadow economy. 
Proposition 2. The presence of direct democracy has a global negative effect on the size of the 
shadow economy. When the degree of direct democracy is relatively low (
* d d £ ), higher levels of 
direct democracy reduce the size of the informal sector. When instead direct democracy is relatively 
high (
* d d > ), higher levels have no effects on the shadow economy. 
Proof.  Under  prevention  (
* d d > ),  higher  levels  of  d   do  not  change  the  reformed  policy  and 
therefore  the  size  of  the  shadow  economy.  From  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 P P d d t y t y g g =   (see  Lemma  3)  and 
Corollaries 1 and 2, follows that the shadow economy under the status quo policy is the same as the 
one under the reformed policy, unless  ) , ( ) , (
s s
P P t t g g =  because of  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0
s s
d d t y t y g g < , and in 
this latter case the reformed policy generates a smaller informal sector than the status quo policy.
9 
Under nonprevention (
* d d £ ), higher levels of d  lower the size of the shadow economy through 
the  following  two  channels.  First,  the  reformed  policy  ) , ( N N t g   implies  a  shadow  economy 
decreasing in  d  (from Lemma 4). Second,  ) , ( ) , ( 0 0 g g t y t y d N N d £ , and from Corollaries 1 and 2, 
this also implies that the size of the shadow economy is higher under the nonprevention policy than 
under the status quo policy; therefore, higher levels of d  reduce the informal sector by making the 
status quo policy more likely. Finally, the size of the shadow economy under prevention is always 
lower  than  under  nonprevention.  This  follows  from  Corollaries  1  and  2  together 
with ) , ( ) , ( P P d N N d t y t y g g £ . ■ 
The framework developed suggests that higher degrees of direct democracy improve the fiscal 
policy implemented by making it more efficient and closer to the preferences of citizens. This in 
turn increases the net marginal productivity of labor in the formal sector and reduces the incentive 
of  individuals  to  operate  in  the  shadow  economy.  The  model  also  predicts  the  existence  of 
nonlinear effects of direct democracy on the size of the informal sector. In particular, an increase in 
the level of direct democracy is likely to reduce substantially the size of the shadow economy when 
direct democracy is at low or intermediate levels, while the effect of such increase is more limited 
when direct democratic institutions are already quite good.  
To summarize, the theoretical approach comes to the core hypothesis that predicts a negative 
relationship between direct democratic institutions and the size of the shadow economy. Countries 
where  direct  democracy  and  its  use  of  popular  initiatives  and  referendums  are  an  essential 
                                                 
9 This the case with the status quo policy not binding for the politician and it is not very interesting since the reformed 
policy is the unconstrained policy of the politician independently on the degree of direct democracy. 16 
 
component of democratic life, are expected to be characterized by a lower informal sector, ceteris 
paribus. This is our main hypothesis, which will econometrically be tested. 
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
4.1 Data Description and Estimation Approach 
 
We develop a cross-sectional analysis on a sample of 85 countries (from Persson and Tabellini, 
2003) that can be considered democracies for the period 1990–1998. We consider only democratic 
countries  since  direct-democratic  institutions  are  likely  to  work  only  in  relatively  stable 
democracies. Referendums and popular initiatives, even if observed, are expected not to produce 
any effect in authoritarian regimes as they are likely to be heavily manipulated by the government. 
And it is also clear even in democracies that the quality of processes realized improves in a contest 
of higher level of civil liberties and political freedom. 
In order to reduce the possibility of omitted variable, we run several regressions controlling for 
a wide range of variables which, according to the existing literature, might have an impact on the 
size  of  the  shadow  economy  and  also  be  correlated  with  the  country’s  democratic  institutional 
organization.  We  avoid  describing  all  variables  in  detail  here;  the  definition  and  sources  are 
reported in the Data Appendix.
10 
Data concerning the informal sector are drawn from the dataset of Schneider (2005), which 
provides the size of the shadow economy as a proportion of official GDP for 145 countries over the 
period 1999 2003. Our dependent variable is an average of the three available observations for the 
period indicated; this allows us to cover up to 73 of the countries considered in the original sample. 
The index of direct democracy (DDI) comes from Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007). They derive it 
from three different sources: Kaufmann (2004) for 43 European countries, Hwang (2005) for 33 
Asian countries, and Madroñal (2005) for 17 Latin American countries. The DDI lies within a range 
of values from 1 to 7, with 7 being associated to the countries rated as radical democrat, and 1 to the 
countries with the lowest level of direct democracy.
11 As pointed out by Fiorino and Ricciuti, the 
main  advantage  of  using  this  index  is  that  it  provides  both  a  qualitative  and  a  quantitative 
assessment  of  direct  democracy.  The  index,  in  fact,  reflects  at  the  same  time  the  quality  of 
democracy and its performance, as it focuses on the two most important and widely used processes, 
                                                 
10 The variables that measure governance and institutional quality come from different datasets (Kaufmann et al., 2005; 
Treisman, 2008; Blaume, 2009). 
11 The only country ranked 7 is Switzerland, while the largest group of countries (twenty-five) takes the value 1. 17 
 
initiatives and referendum, as well as on the quality of the processes themselves.
12 However, the 
DDI has some disadvantages that have to be discussed. First, it links together the legal possibility of 
having referendums and initiatives and the actual choice of using them. Second, it does not allow to 
identify the issues tackled by referendums and initiatives. Finally, the index is a subjective measure 
of direct democracy, so the criteria followed to construct it remain somehow vague. 
In testing the hypothesis that a higher degree of citizens’ direct political participation lowers 
ceteris paribus, the size of shadow economies, we use a baseline specification that includes the 
following control variables: 
(1)  We  take  into  account  the  age  of  democracy  as  well  as  the  quality  of  democracy 
(proxied by the PolityIV index), as the actual use of direct democracy is more likely to 
occur in stable and older democracies.  
(2) Moreover, both the quality and the consolidation of democracy go hand in hand with 
the quality of government institutions and influence the incentive of citizens to operate 
in the informal sector.  
(3) The baseline regression also contains a measure of district magnitude. The reasoning 
motivating  the  inclusion  of  this  variable  is  that  government  accountability  to  the 
constituents is supposed to be higher when  geographic size of the district is small 
(Blume et al., 2009). 
(4)  For the same reason, we add a measure of the country size and a variable for the 
federal structure. In our opinion, larger countries may encounter greater difficulties in 
controlling economic activity and this could lead to an increase in the size of shadow 
economy; while federal countries appear to better encounter the preferences of citizens 
and secure a higher quality of public spending, being correlated with a lower size of 
shadow economy (Torgler et al., 2010, Teobaldelli, 2011). The issue is also discussed 
in Schneider and Enste (2002) who emphasize that a combination of fiscal federalism 
and appropriate elements of direct democracy might reinforce public trust in political 
institutions and foster tax morality.  
(5) We also use an index of ethnic fractionalization because a large literature indicates that 
ethnic heterogeneity is a determinant of economic performance both in terms of output 
                                                 
12 In other words, it allows taking into account even the quality of procedures underlying the actual use of popular 
initiatives and referendums to propose, approve, amend and delete laws. In order to clarify this point, Fiorino and 
Ricciuti mention the case of Belarus as an example: despite 9 referendums had been held in this country from 1995 to 
2004, Belarus is characterized by the lowest possible score in the range, as referendums were proposed and used by 
President Lukashenko in order to amplify its power at the expense of the legislature and a positive outcome was secured 
thanks to arrests of political adversaries and pressure on citizens. However Belarus is not included in our sample. 18 
 
and quality of institutions (La Porta et al., 1999; Alesina et al., 2003).  
(6) We then include the log of GDP in 1960 to take into account the level of economic 
development.
13  
(7) We employ also the central government expenditures, including social security, as a 
percentage of GDP to proxy for the size of government, and the burden of regulation, 
that captures the intensity of regulation in the economic system and reflects the ability 
of  government  to  implement  market-friendly  policies  promoting  private  sector 
development. Both variables are cited in various studies on the hidden economy as the 
most important determinants of the increase of the shadow economy  (Tanzi, 1999; 
Johnson et al., 1998a,b; Friedman et al., 1999; Schneider and Enste, 2000; Kaufmann 
et al., 2005).  
(8) We also control for the percentage of the population professing the Protestant religion, 
since  religious  beliefs  might  affect  people´s  attitudes  toward  the  economic  system, 
private property and tax compliance in particular (La Porta, 1997; Landes, 1998): 
(9) Furthermore  we  consider  the  characteristics  of  the  political  system,  by  including  a 
variable  for  the  electoral  system  (proportional  or  majoritarian  electoral  rule)  and  a 
variable for the form of government (presidential or parliamentary regime). We also 
consider a measure of the operational (de facto) independence of the Chief Executive. 
The  use  of  these  variables  might  capture  the  extent  to  which  political  leaders  are 
insulated from citizens and can exert their discretionary power, since more insulated 
politicians  tend  to  extract  rents  from  public  budget  at  expense  of  voters  welfare. 
Alternative institutional arrangements provide different levels of checks and balances 
among the body of the government, and differ in the degree of accountability to voters. 
Following this reasoning, we can expect that presidential and majoritarian systems are 
more  accountable.  Moreover  it  can  be  argued  that  the  features  of  government  and 
electoral  systems  are  able  to  influence  composition  and  dimension  of  public 
expenditure (Persson and Tabellini, 2003), affecting by this way the size of the shadow 
economy.  
(10)  In addition, we control for a measure of labor market regulation and the level of 
education as these may affect the incentive of the individuals to operate in the informal 
sector. The latter is also important in promoting civic participation and cooperation 
with  others,  so  facilitating  the  support  for  more  democratic  regimes  (Lipset,  1959; 
                                                 
13 The reason for using the GDP of 1960 is to avoid possible endogeneity problems with respect to the dependent 
variable. 19 
 
Glaeser et al. 2006).  
(11)  We include the demographic characteristics of population, given respectively by the 
percentage  of  the  population  between  age  15  and  64,  and  the  percentage  of  the 
population aged 65 and older, that can influence the total amount and the composition 
of public expenditure and have an impact on fiscal policies.  
(12)  The degree of openness to international trade is also taken into account since the 
literature on shadow economy suggests that globalization of markets and increasing 
competitiveness of third world economies, which exhibit lower production costs, can 
affect firms decision to operate in the informal sector (Gerxhani, 1999).  
(13)  We  control  for  legal,  historical,  and  geographical  characteristics  by  including 
variables  for  legal  origins  (common  law,  French  civil  law,  German  civil  law, 
Scandinavian  civil  law,  and  socialist  law),  for  colonial  history  (British,  Spanish-
Portuguese, or other colonial origins), and for geographical localization (Africa, East 
Asia, Latin America, Central America, or the Caribbean), considered crucial factors to 
evaluate the efficiency of the government, the quality of public goods, as well as the 
size of government and political freedom.  
(14)  Also we use an index of religious fractionalization and income inequality to control 
for the heterogeneity in the society. We add a control set for the religious affiliation 
(the percentage of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic religion in 1980, 
and an index on Confucian, Buddhist or Zen religious traditions) as a proxy for the 
dimension of culture given that many studies have stressed the role of religion beliefs 
in shaping individuals attitudes like ethic, trust, tolerance, and compliance (La Porta et 
al.,  1997;  Landes,  1998).  An  index  for  the  civil  liberties  and  political  rights  is 
considered  as  these  features  can  be  related  to  the  working  of  direct  democratic 
institutions.  
(15)  Finally,  we  control  for  the  efficiency  and  the  quality  of  public  institutions  by 
including  an  index  of  protection  of  property  rights,  an  index  of  government 
effectiveness, that takes into account the perception of the quality of public service 
provision, an index of government anti-diversion policies, an index for the rule of law, 
and an index of corruption of government officials. 
 
4.2 Empirical Results and their Interpretation 
Table 4.1 provides some descriptive statistics for the main variables employed. The mean size of 
the shadow economy in the sample is about 31 percent of GDP and the average value of the direct 20 
 
democracy index is 3.45. Table 4.2 reports the correlation among some variables and reveals that all 
measures of quality of democracy used are negatively correlated with the shadow economy. In 
particular, we observe a high negative correlation (−0.57) between direct democratic institutions 
and the shadow economy,  as predicted by the  model. Moreover, there is a positive correlation 
among all measures of democracy employed; the index of direct democracy is correlated (0.36) 
with the age of democracy and is highly correlated (0.60) with the quality of democracy. Table 4.3 
reports the average value of the direct democracy index for each quartile of the distribution of the 
size of the shadow economy. The average direct democracy index is 4.92 in the first quartile of the 
distribution and decreases continuously until 2.07 in the last quartile. 
Our empirical strategy is based on two alternative specifications. The first specification takes 
the following form: 
i i i i Z DDI SE e b b a + + + = ' 2 1 , 
where SE and DDI stand for the size of the shadow economy and the index of direct democracy 
respectively, whereas the Z vector is composed of various control variables and  i e  is an error term. 
Table 4.4 shows the estimates for this specification.  
Column (1) of Table 4.4 shows that an increase of one point in the direct democracy index 
reduces, on average, the share of the informal sector by 4.63 percentage points. The estimate of our 
baseline specification where we control for a number of variables is reported in Column (2). We 
find that the direct democracy coefficient is –2.71 and it is statistically significant at 1% level. This 
means, for example, that an increase in the direct democracy index by 4 points, which corresponds 
to a shift from the first to the third quartile of the distribution, reduces the shadow economy by 11 
percentage points, i.e., more than one third of the average size of the informal sector in the sample. 
The estimate also confirms the theoretical prediction that a lower district magnitude is associated 
with a smaller shadow economy. 
Next we modify the baseline specification by adding one control variable (or one group of such 
variables) at a time to generate eighteen further specifications. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.4 
report the estimates of specifications where proxies for the political system, electoral system and 
form of government, and the insulation of policy makers are added to the baseline specification; 
these  estimates  confirm  the  importance  of  the  direct  democracy  in  explaining  the  size  of  the 
informal sector as the size of the direct democracy coefficient is basically unchanged with respect to 
the baseline specification and its statistically significance is always at standard levels. Including 
measures of labor regulation, education, demography, and openness to international trade (Columns 
(5), (6), (7), and (8), respectively) it leaves the results unchanged. Columns (9) and (10) show the 
robustness  of  results  when  legal  origins  and  colonial  origins  are  taken  into  account,  while 21 
 
geographic location, culture, religious fractionalization and income inequality are included in the 
estimates  whose  results  are  reported  in  Columns  (11),  (12),  (13)  and  (14)  respectively.  The 
estimated coefficient of the direct democracy index is similar to the baseline specification and it is 
always  statistically  significant  at  standard  levels.  The  weakest  specifications  are  the  ones  that 
includes  the  geographic  location  and  income  inequality;  the  statistically  significance  of  the 
estimated direct democracy coefficient drops to 10% level. The next five columns of Table 4.4, 
from (14) to (19), confirm the results when various measures related to institutional quality—such 
as protection of property rights, government effectiveness, perception of government anti-diversion 
policies,  rule  of  law,  and  perception  of  corruption—are  employed.  The  same  is  true  when  we 
control for civil liberties and political rights (see Column (20)). 
To summarize, the picture emerges that direct democracy is strongly associated with lower 
levels  of  the  shadow  economy.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  district  magnitude  is  important  in 
explaining the size of the informal sector and we now move to analyze this point more in deep. 
In the second specification, we are interested in estimating how direct democratic institutions 
and the magnitude of district interact each other in determining the size of the shadow economy. In 
particular, we estimate the following equation: 
( ) i i i i i i Z M DISTRICT DDI M DISTRICT DDI SE e b b b b a + + ´ + + + = ' _ _ 4 3 2 1 , 
where in addition to the variables of the previous specification, the estimation now includes the 
interaction  term  between  the  direct  democracy  index  and  the  district  magnitude 
( ) i i M DISTRICT DDI _ ´ .  The  conjecture  motivating  the  inclusion  of  this  variable  is  that  direct 
democratic institutions and other features of the political process, such as the district magnitude, can 
either  reinforce  or  substitute  each  other  as  potential  correction  mechanisms  for  the  low 
accountability of policy-makers.
14 It is therefore interesting to understand how these two political 
institutions interact each other, namely whether they are complements or substitute. 
The  inclusion  of  an  interacting  term  implies  that  the  coefficients  1 b   and  2 b   capture 
respectively the impact of direct democracy and district magnitude on the shadow economy only 
when district magnitude is equal to zero. The marginal effect of direct democracy,  DDI, on the 
size of the shadow economy is now given by  ( ) DDI M DISTRICT SE D + = D _ 3 1 b b . Table 4.5 reports 
the estimates of this additional specification. 
Column (1) of Table 4.5 shows the estimate when we include the direct democracy index, the 
                                                 
14 As discussed in the Persson and Tabellini’s book (see Chapter 8 for details), district magnitude is highly correlated 
with the electoral system (this correlation is 0.84 in our sample); the electoral districts are large in proportional systems 
and small in majoritarian ones. 22 
 
district magnitude and the interaction term of these two indexes only, while the estimate of our 
baseline specification containing the most important control variables is reported in Column (2). In 
the baseline specification, we obtain an estimated coefficient of direct democracy equal to -4.03 
and an estimated coefficient of the interaction term of 3.19. This implies that the marginal effect of 
direct democracy is -4.03 for the largest possible district magnitude (DISTRICT_M=0, i.e., of a 
single  national  district)  and -0.84  when  the  district  magnitude  is  the  lowest  possible 
(DISTRICT_M=1). In other words, we obtain that the effect of direct democracy on the shadow 
economy increases with district magnitude. As the average value of district magnitude in the sample 
is 0.367, the effect of direct democracy evaluated at the mean is (-4.03+3.19x0.367)=-2.86, which 
in line with the results of the first specification. 
The estimated coefficient of the direct democracy index is statistically significant at standard 
levels in all specifications. The coefficient of direct democracy and the interaction term are jointly 
significant at standard levels in most, but not all, specifications. In particular, when controlling for 
the political system, colonial origins and rule of law (see Columns (3), (10) and (18) respectively), 
the  joint  significance  of  the  two  coefficients  is  at  10%,  while  they  are  not  jointly  statistically 
significant  at  standard  levels  when  we  control  for  geography  or  anti-diversion  policies  (see 
Columns  (11)  and  (17)  respectively).  This  can  be  partly  explained  with  the  fact  that  the  anti-
diversion policies coefficient reduces the number of observations, while the geography controls are 
probably highly correlated with the characteristics of the political system. 
In sum, these results demonstrate that the effect of direct democracy on the level of shadow 
economy has a negative influence, is quantitatively important and the results are robust and do 
depend on district magnitude, too.  
 
5.  Summary and Policy Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development 
of the shadow economies of 56 countries which have some direct democratic institutions. The main 
result of our theoretical analysis is that direct democratic institutions have a negative influence on 
the size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. The empirical / econometric investigation confirms 
this  hypothesis  and  the  econometric  results  demonstrate  that  the  effect  of  direct  democratic 
institutions on the shadow economy is negative and quantitatively important; the results are robust 
and also depend on the interaction of direct democracy with other political institutions, such as 
district magnitude. 
What policy conclusions can we draw from our results? We have the following three: 23 
 
(1) Institutional arrangements, like good governance, are an important factor influencing the 
size and development of the shadow economy. 
(2) This  clearly  means  that  governments  should  aim  to  have  a  proper  functioning  of  state 
institutions, so that the shadow economy can be reduced. 
(3) Especially direct democratic institutions are quite important in this context. They have a 
quantitative  important  effect  on  the  shadow  economy;  hence  policy  makers  should 
strengthen them and/or introduce them to a larger extent. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used 
 
  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 

























Quality of democracy  56  7.81  2.67  −2  10 
Size of government  56  29.13  11.39  9.74  51.18 
Log of GDP per capita in 1960  56  6.79  0.73  5.17  8.14 
Country size  56  12.43  1.66  6.47  16.65 
Burden of regulation  56  0.71  0.70  −1.54  1.97 
           
           
           
Ethnic fragmentation  56  0.22  0.21  0  0.74 
           




Table 4.2: Correlation between direct democracy index, shadow economy, and quality of democracy 
 
                 


















Age of democracy 





































   
Size of government  −0.43  0.61  −0.17  −0.07  0.28  0.45  1   
Burden of regulation  −0.63  0.47  −0.20  0.07  0.51  0.48  0.31  1 




Table 4.3: Distribution of the size of the shadow economy (S.E.) in the whole sample 
 
           
  1
st quartile  2
nd quartile  3
rd quartile  4
th quartile  Total 
  9.13 ≤ S.E. ≤ 18.83  18.87 ≤ S.E. ≤28.47  29.33 ≤ S.E. ≤ 41  41.27 ≤ S.E. ≤ 67.83   















           
           
Total  14  15  14  14  57  










       
           









Table 4.4: OLS cross-country estimates with direct democracy. 
                     
Dep. var.: Shadow economy  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                     




















District magnitude  
 








































































Log of GDP per capita  
 














































































































Political system      [0.051]               
                     
Executive constraints        −3.79             
        (2.32)*             
Labor regulation 
 
        0.86 
(1.80) 
         
Education            −0.03         
            (0.12)         
Demography              [0.151]       
                     
Openness                −0.07     
                (0.04)*     
Legal origins                  [0.194]   
                     
Colonial origins                    [0.382] 
                     
Observations   57  55  55  55  53  55  55  55  55  55 
R-squared  0.36  0.71  0.76  0.73  0.71  0.71  0.74  0.73  0.74  0.73 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When groups of dummies are included as controls, p-values for the joint significance of such 




Table 4.4 – (continued). OLS cross-country estimates with direct democracy. 
                     
Dep. var.: Shadow economy  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
                     


































































































































































































































Geography  [0.057]                   
                     
Culture    [0.363]                 
                     
Religious fractionalization 
 
    −1.91 
(6.16) 
             
Income inequality        0.38 
(0.18)** 
           
Protection of property rights          −3.16 
 (2.45) 
         
Government effectiveness            2.62 
(1.74) 
       
Anti-diversion policies              −52.38 
 (21.67)** 
     
Rule of law                −12.00 
 (3.34)*** 
   
Corruption                  3.78 
(1.43)** 
 
Civil liberties and political 
rights 
                  0.92 
(2.26) 
                     
Observations   55  55  55  51  54  54  48  55  54  55 
R-squared  075  0.73  0.71  0.78  0.73  0.73  0.82  0.79  0.74  0.71 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When groups of dummies are included as controls, p-values for the joint significance of such 





Table 4.5: OLS cross-country estimates with direct democracy and the interaction term of direct democracy 
with district magnitude. 
                     
Dep. var.: Shadow economy  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
                     






























































P-value joint significance 
 
[0.000]  [0.011]  [0.101]  [0.027]  [0.016]  [0.014]  [0.058]  [0.005]  [0.066]  [0.102] 
Federalism  
 


















Quality of democracy 
 




































Log of GDP per capita  
 














































































































Political system      [0.120]               
                     
Executive constraints        −4.09 
(2.06)* 
           
Labor regulation 
 
        1.16 
(1.75) 
         
Education            −0.04 
(0.11) 
       
Demography              [0.231]       
                     
Openness                −0.07 
(0.04)* 
   
Legal origins                  [0.407]   
                     
Colonial origins                    [0.628] 
                     
Observations   56  55  55  55  53  55  55  55  55  55 
R-squared  0.38  0.73  0.77  0.75  0.72  0.73  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.74 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When groups of dummies are included as controls, p-values for the joint significance of such 




Table 4.5 – (continued). OLS cross-country estimates with direct democracy and the interaction term of 
direct democracy with district magnitude. 
                     
Dep. var.: Shadow economy  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20) 
                     






























































P-value joint significance 
 





























































































































































































Geography  [0.147]                   
                     
Culture    [0.499]                 
                     
Religious fractionalization 
 
    −4.07 
(6.01) 
             
Income inequality        0.29 
(0.17) 
           
Protection of property rights          −2.32 
(2.49) 
         
Government effectiveness            1.87 
(1.96) 
       
Anti-diversion policies              −51.18 
(22.21)** 
     
Rule of law                −11.52 
(3.57)*** 
   
Corruption                  3.25 
(1.42) 
 
Civil liberties and political 
rights 
                  1.27 
(2.22) 
                     
Observations   55  55  55  51  54  54  48  55  54  55 
R-squared  0.76  0.74  0.73  0.79  0.74  0.73  0.82  0.79  0.74  0.73 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. When groups of dummies are included as controls, p-values for the joint significance of such 
















Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2 
 
In  finding  the  solution  to  problem  (14),  it  is  useful  to  observe  two  things.  First,  the  objective 
function takes its minimum value  B p u R =  for all extreme values of t and g . When  0 = t ,  1 = t , or 
0 = g  there is no production in the formal sector, no government revenues, and hence no resources 
for  politician’s  rents  (and  B p u R = ).  In  particular,  0 = g   means  that  public  services  are  not 
provided; this implies that there cannot be production in the formal sector, so that  1 = l , and the 
same is true when  0 = t . All labor is employed in the shadow economy when  1 = t  because all 
production in the formal sector would accrue to government revenues. When  1 = g , all revenues are 
spent for the provision of public services and, again,  B p u R = . Second, when  t and  g  both take 
intermediate values, there is always production in the formal sector because the production function 
satisfies  the  Inada  conditions.  This  implies  that  the  revenues  of  the  public  sector  and  the 
nonmonetary rents of the politician are strictly positive—in other words, that  B p u R > . These two 
facts imply that the solution of maximization problem (14) for t and g  is interior. We now show 
that there exists only one critical point  ) , (
s s t g ; when combined with the previous conditions and 
the fact that the function u is well-defined in a compact set, this implies that  ) , (
s s t g  is also the 
maximum of our problem. 
The critical point  ) , (
s s t g  that we seek is defined as the point where the first derivatives of the 
function u in (14) with respect to t and g  are zero—that is, by the two conditions 





































where  t l ¶ ¶ /  and  g ¶ ¶ / l  are given by (11) and (12), respectively. 
Taking into account (11), condition (A1) is 
0
) 1 )( 1 (
1
) 1 ( ) 1 (








- - - =
¶










a a a a ; 
after some manipulations of the expression in brackets, this can be rewritten as 
(A3)  [ ] 0 )) 1 ( ( ) 1 )( 1 (
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. 
The sign of  t u ¶ ¶ /  matches the sign of the bracketed component, since the remaining components 34 
 
of  (A3)  are  always  strictly  positive  (recall  that  t  and  g   are  interior).  Therefore,  the  tax  rate 















with  ) , (
s s s t l l g º  as defined by (10). 
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Summing the last two components of (A4) and rearranging terms then yields 
0
) 1 (
) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
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a a a , 
and after some algebra, the expression in (A4) becomes 
(A5)  ( )( ) [ ] 0 ) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( 1 1
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The  fraction  preceding  the  bracketed  component  of  (A5)  is  strictly  positive,  so  the  fraction  of 
















with  ) , (
s s s t l l g º  as defined by (10). 
We now show that 
s t  and 
s g  are unique and that  ) 1 , 1 ( a - Î
s t  and  ) 1 , 0 ( Î
s g . Consider first 











) ( . 
Next observe that  0 ) 1 /( ) 1 ( / ) (
2 < + - - - = l dl l df b b b a . At  0 = t  and  1 = t , by Lemma 1 we have 
1 = l  and therefore  a - =1 ) (l f . For any  a - <1 t  we have  0 / < ¶ ¶ t l  (see again Lemma 1), and 
together  with  0 / ) ( < dl l df   this  means  that  ) (l f   is  increasing  in  t  and  that  ) (l f t <   for  all 
[ ] a - Î 1 , 0 t .  For  any  a - >1 t   we  have  0 / > ¶ ¶ t l ,  and  0 / ) ( < dl l df   implies  that  ) (l f   is 
decreasing in t for all  ( ] 1 , 1 a - Î t . Since  ) (l f t <  for all  a - £1 t  and since  ) (l f  is decreasing in t 
for all  a - >1 t  (with  1 1 ) ( < - = a l f  at  1 = t ), it follows that the tax rate 
s t  satisfying equation 
(15) is unique and that  1 1 < < -
s t a  . 35 
 
To show that 










) 1 )( 1 (
) ( . 
This function is increasing in l because  0 ) 1 /( ) 1 )( 1 ( / ) (
2 > - + - - - = l l dl l dh a b b b a a . Since l is 
monotonically  decreasing  in  g   ( 0 / < g d dl ,  see  Lemma  1),  it  follows  that  ) (l h   is  also 
monotonically decreasing in g  (i.e.,  0 / ) ( < g d l dh ). This, together with  1 ) ( = l h  at  0 = g , implies 
that the solution to equation (16) is unique and that  1 0 < <
s g . 
The critical point  ) , (
s s t g  defined by equations (15) and (16) is the maximum of problem (14). 
Given that the objective function defined in (14) takes the minimum value for all extreme values of 
t  and  g   and  given  that  it  is  well-defined  in  a  compact  set,  it  follows  that  this  function  is 
monotonically  increasing  in  t  for 
s t t <   and  monotonically  decreasing  for 
s t t > ;  it  is  also 
monotonically increasing in g  for 
s g g <  and monotonically decreasing for 
s g g > . 
The total amount of public services provided by an unconstrained politician is lower than the 
level provided by a benevolent one. This result can be shown by observing that (15) and (16) imply 
that  a g - =1
s st . Given the government budget constraint (6), the level of per capita public services 
provided is 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
/ 1 / 1 s s s s s l l t g - - = - =
a a b g , 
whereas the optimal level is 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
/ 1 / 1 * * * * * - - = - = l l t g
a a a g ; 
here  ) , (
s s s t l l g º  and  ) , (
* * * º g t l l . Recall from Lemma 1 that l is monotonically decreasing in g  
and monotonically increasing in t for  a - >1 t . Then, from 
* < g g
s  and  a - = >
* 1 t t
s , it follows 
that 
* > l l
s  and hence that 







Shadow economy = SHAD_AV 
Direct democracy index = DDI 
District magnitude = MAGN 
Interaction term district magnitude and direct democracy = MAGNDDI = MAGN*DDI 
Square of district magnitude = DDI2 = DDI*DDI 
Federalism = FEDERAL 
Quality of democracy = POLITYIV 
Age of democracy = AGE 
Log of the GDP per capita in 1960 = LCGDP_60 
Country size = LAREA 
Burden of regulation = QREGU_9698 
Size of government = CGEXP 
Composition of government expenditure = SSW 
Protestant = PROT80 
Ethnic fragmentation = AVELF 
Political system = MAJ, PRES 
Executive constraints = XCONST9002 
Labor regulation = LABOREGU_03 
Education = EDUGER 
Demography = PROP1564, PROP65 
Openness = TRADE 
Legal origins = LEGOR (UK, FR, GE, SO, SC) 
Colonial origins = COL_ESP, COL_OTH, COL_UK 
Geography = AFRICA, ASIAE, LAAM 
Culture = CATHO, CONFU 
Religious fractionalization = RELIGION 
Income inequality = GINI_8090 
Protection of property rights = PROPRIGHT 
Government effectiveness = GOVEF 
Anti-diversion policies = GADP 
Rule of law = LAW_9698 
Corruption = GRAFT 
Civil liberties and political rights = GASTIL 
 
Fiscal Decentralization = Subnational expenditures (as % total government expenditures) = 
SNE7200 
Autonomy = AUTON 
Average size of bottom tier units = SIZEBOT 
Ethnic fragmentation = ETHNIC 
 
Note that most of the variables come from Persson and Tabellini (2003). In this case we report this dataset as 
“source” and the sources they cite as “original source”. 
 
AFRICA: regional dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is in Africa, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003). 
 
AGE: Age of democracy, defined as AGE=(2000–DEM_AGE)/200 and varying between 0 and 1, with the 
United States being the oldest democracy (value of 1). Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
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AREA: Land area of the country in squared kilometers. Source: Data available at www.cepii.fr  
 
ASIAE: regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003). 
 
AUTON:  dummy  variable  that  takes  the  value  1  if,  under  constitution,  subnational  legislatures  have 
autonomy in certain specified areas - i.e. constitutional authority to legislate - not explicitly subject to central 
laws, and 0 otherwise. Source: Treisman (2008). 
 
AVELF: index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, approximating the level of lack of ethnic and linguistic 
cohesion within a country, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) and averaging 5 
different indexes. Source: La Porta et al. (1998). For Central and Eastern Europe countries computations 
follow Mauro (1995) with data from Quain (1999). 
 
CATHO80: percentage of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic religion in 1980. Source: Persson 
and Tabellini (2003); original source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
CGDP_60: real Gross Domestic Product per capita (current prices) in 1960. From the Penn World Table 
Version 6.1 (variable named cgdp). If the data is not available in 1960, I multiply the GDP per capita of U.S. 
in 1960 with current per capita GDP expressed relative to the United States (variable y in the Penn World 
Table, divided by 100) in the first year available. 
 
CGEXP: Total expenditure of the central government as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item 
Government Finance-Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100. 
Source: Persson and Tabellini. Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: IMF–IFS CD-Rom and IMF–
IFS Yearbook. 
 
COL_ESP: dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of Spain or Portugal, 0 otherwise. 
Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). Original source: Wacziarg (1996). 
 
COL_OTH: dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former colony of a country other than Spain, or 
Portugal, or the U.K., 0 otherwise. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). Original source: Wacziarg (1996). 
 
COL_UK: dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former UK colony, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson 
and Tabellini (2003). Original source: Wacziarg (1996). 
 
CONFU: dummy variable for religious tradition, equal to 1 if the majority of population is Confucian–
Buddhist–Zen, 0 otherwise. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). Original source: Wacziarg (1996), CIA-
The World Factbook 2000. 
 
COUNTRY: Name of the country. 
 
CPI9500:  corruption  perception  index,  measuring  perceptions  of  abuse  of  power  from  public  officials. 
Average  of  the  CPI  Index  over  the  period  1995-2000,  which  ranges  from  0  to  10,  with  higher  values 
denoting more corruption. Source: Transparency International (www.transparency.de) and Internet Center 
for Corruption Research (www.gwdg.de/˜uwvw). 
 
CTRYCD: IMF country code that identifies countries. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
 
DDI: direct democracy index is a number in the 1 to 7 scale for each category, with 7 being the country rated 
as radical democrat, and 1 the countries with the lowest level of direct democracy. Source: Fiorino and 
Ricciuti (2007). Original sources: Kaufmann (2004) for 43 European countries, Hwang (2005) for 33 Asian 
countries, and Madroñal (2005) for 17 Latin American countries. 
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DEM_AGE:  first  year  of  democratic  rule,  corresponding  to  the  first  year  of  an  uninterrupted  string  of 
positive yearly values of the variable polity (see below) until the end of the sample, given that the country 
was also an independent nation. Does not count foreign occupation during WWII as an interruption of 
democracy. See POLITY. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
 
DISTRICTS: the number of electoral districts in a country (including the number of primary as well as 
secondary and tertiary if applicable). Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). Original sources: Quain (1999), 
Kurian (1998), and national sources. 
 
EDUGER: Total enrollment in primary and secondary education in a country, as a percentage of the relevant 
age group in the country’s population. Computed by dividing the number of students enrolled in a given 
level of education (regardless of age) by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the 
given level of education and multiplying the result by 100. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original 
source: UNESCO. 
 
ETHNIC:  Ethnic  Fractionalization  Index  from  Alesina,  Devleeschauwer,  Easterly,  Kurlat  and  Wacziarg 
(2004). The variable takes values in the range between zero and one that are increasing in the degree of 
ethnic fractionalization. Source: Alesina et al. (2004). 
 
FBE25: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is unitary (i.e. the variable FEDERAL takes a value equal 
to 0) and the average value of subnational share of total government spending for the years 1972-2000 
(SNE7200) is higher than 25% (last quartile of the distribution), and 0 otherwise. 
 
FEDERAL: Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise. Source: 
Persson and Tabellini (2003), Treisman (2000), Treisman (2008). 
 
GADP: Index of a government’s antidiversion policies, measured in 1986–95. The variable is the result of an 
equal-weighted  average  of  five  categories:  law  and  order,  bureaucratic  quality,  corruption,  risk  of 
expropriation,  government  repudiation  of  contracts.  The  index  ranges  from  0  to  1,  with  higher  values 
corresponding to more effective policies of the government toward supporting production. Source: Persson 
and Tabellini (2003); original source: Hall and Jones (1999).  
 
GASTIL: Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, where each index is measured on a 1–7 
scale  with  1  representing  the  highest  degree  of  freedom  and  7  the  lowest.  Countries  whose  combined 
averages for political rights and civil liberties fall between 1.0 and 2.5 are designed “free”, those whose 
averages fall between 3 and 5.5 are designed as “partly free”, and those whose averages fall between 5.5 and 
7.0 “not free”. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: Freedom House. 
 
GINI_8090:  Gini  coefficient  of  income  distribution,  realized  as  the  average  of  two  data  points:  the 
observation closet to 1980 and the observation closest to 1990. When data for only one of the two years are 
available, only that year is included. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: Deininger and 
Squire (1996). 
 
GOVEF: Index that reflects perception of the quality of public services provision, the quality of bureaucracy, 
the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single grouping. Ranges from 0 to 10 with 
lower  values  corresponding  to  more  government  effectiveness.  Source:  Persson  and  Tabellini  (2003); 
original source: Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
 
GRAFT: Index of perceptions of corruption. Ranges from 0 to 10 with lower values corresponding to better 
outcomes. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
 
LAAM:  Regional  dummy  variable,  equal  to  1  if  a  country  is  in  Latin  America  or  the  Caribbeans,  0 
otherwise. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003). 
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LABOREGU_03: Index that reflects the impact of minimum wage set by law, the features of hiring and 
firing practices, the presence of unemployment benefits, the impact of centralized collective bargaining in 
setting wages and the use of conscripts to obtain military personnel. Ranges from 1 to 10, with higher values 
representing a lower degree of regulation and is relative to the year 2003. Source: Gwartney and Lawson 
(2004). 
 
LAREA: Natural logarithm of the variable AREA. Source: Data available on: www.cepii.fr  
 
LAW_9698: Index of the rule of law, reflecting the quality of the legal system. Ranges between -2.5 and 2.5 
with higher values corresponding to better outcomes. The index includes perceptions of the predictability and 
effectiveness of the judiciary, the incidence of crime and the enforceability of contracts. I use average values 
of the variable for 1996-98. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005), data available on www.worldbank.org  
 
LCGDP_60: Log of the real GDP per capita in 1960. Obtained taking the log of the variable CGDP_60. 
Source: Penn World Table Version 6.1 
 
LEGOR (UK, FR, GE, SO, SC): Dummy variables for the origin of the legal system in a country, classifying 
a country’s legal system as having its origins in French civil law (FR), German civil law (GE), Scandinavian 
law (SC), Socialist law (SO), or Anglo-Saxon common law (UK). Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); 
original source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
MAGN: inverse of district magnitude, defined as DISTRICTS over SEATS. Source: Persson and Tabellini 
(2003). 
 
MAJ: Dummy variable for electoral systems equal to 1 if all the lower house is elected under plurality rule, 0 
otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower hose) are considered. Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); 
original sources: Cox (1997), International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), Kurian 
(1998), Quain (1998) and national sources. 
 
POLITYIV:  Score  for  democracy  ranging  from  +10  (strongly  democratic)  to  –10  (strongly  autocratic). 
Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: Polity IV Project 
 
PRES: Dummy variable for the form of government, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. Only 
regimes where the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive (even if an elected president 
is not chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes. Most 
semi-presidential  and  premier-presidential  systems  are  classified  as  parliamentary.  Source:  Persson  and 
Tabellini (2003); original source: Shugart and Carey (1992). 
 
PROP1564:  Percentage  of  a  country’s  population  between  15  and  64  years old in  the total  population. 
Source: Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: World Development Indicators CD-Rom 1999. 
 
PROP65: Percentage of a country’s population over the age of 65 in the total population. Source: Persson 
and Tabellini (2003); original source: World Development Indicators CD-Rom 1999. 
 
PROPRIGHT: Variable that measures the ability of legal system to protect property rights. Refers to 1997 
and ranges between 1 and 5 with higher values corresponding to a higher degree of security. Source: La 
Porta et al. (1999); original source: 1997 Index of Economic Freedom. 
  
PROT80: Percentage of the population in each country professing the Protestant religion in 1980. Source: 
Persson and Tabellini (2003); original source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
QREGU_9698:  Measures  the  intensity  of  regulation  in  the  economic  system  and  reflects  the  ability  of 
government to implement market-friendly policies promoting private sector development. The scores of this 
variable lie between –2.5 and 2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. I use average values 
of the variable for 1996-98. Source: Kaufmann et al. (2005), data available on www.worldbank.org  40 
 
 
RELIGION:  Religious  Fractionalization  Index  from  Alesina,  Devleeschauwer,  Easterly,  Kurlat  and 
Wacziarg (2004). The variable takes values in the range between zero and one that are increasing in the 
degree of religious fractionalization. 
 
SIZEBOT: Average size of bottom tier units, in thousand square kilometers (i.e., surface area divided by 
estimated number of bottom tier units). Source: Treisman (2008). 
 
SEATS: number of seats in lower or single chamber for the latest legislature of each country. It is also 
related to the number of districts in which primary elections are held. Source: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (1997), Quain (1999), Kurian (1998) and nationalsources. 
 
SHAD_AV: Variable that measures the size of shadow economy as a percentage of GDP. Has been obtained 
using the DYMIMIC and the Currency Demand approach (latent estimation approach). I use average values 
of the variable for 1999-2003. Is available for 145 countries. Source: Schneider (2005).  
 
SNE7200:  Average  value  of  subnational  share  of  total  government  spending  for  the  years  1972–2000. 
Source:  International  Monetary  Fund's  Government  Finance  Statistics  -  reported  in  the  World  Bank’s 
database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators. 
 
T_INDEP: Number of years of independence for a country, ranging from 0 to 250. Source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003); original source: Wacziarg (1996).  
 
TRADE: Sum of exports and imports of good and services measured as a share of GDP.B Source: Persson 
and Tabellini (2003); original source: World Bank 2000. 
 
SSW: consolidated central government expenditures on social services and welfare as percentage of GDP, as 
reported in GFS Yearbook, divided by GDP and multiplied by 100. Source: Persson and Tabellini. Original 
source: IMF - GFS Yearbook 2000 and IMF - IFS CD-Rom. 
 
XCONST9002:  Executive  Constraints.  Measure  of  operational  (de  facto)  independence  of  the  Chief 
Executive. Average over 1990–2002 period for variable XCONST. It ranges from 1 (minimum degree of 
constraint) to 7 (maximum degree of constraint). The ranking decreases in the degree of insulation of the 
Executive. Source: Polity IV dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 